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Abstract
We introduce the study of sequential infor-
mation elicitation in strategic multi-agent
systems. In an information elicitation setup
a center attempts to compute the value of a
function based on private information (a-k-
a secrets) accessible to a set of agents. We
consider the classical multi-party computa-
tion setup where each agent is interested in
knowing the result of the function. How-
ever, in our setting each agent is strategic,
and since acquiring information is costly, an
agent may be tempted not spending the ef-
forts of obtaining the information, free-riding
on other agents’ computations. A mechanism
which elicits agents’ secrets and performs the
desired computation defines a game. A mech-
anism is ‘appropriate’ if there exists an equi-
librium in which it is able to elicit (suffi-
ciently many) agents’ secrets and perform the
computation, for all possible secret vectors.
We characterize a general efficient procedure
for determining an appropriate mechanism,
if such mechanism exists. Moreover, we also
address the existence problem, providing a
polynomial algorithm for verifying the exis-
tence of an appropriate mechanism.
1 Introduction
Information elicitation deals with the extraction of in-
formation from agents. In a multi-agent setup a dis-
tinguished agent (a-k-a the center) may be interested
in extracting information from a set of agents, each of
which has its own private information. In general, it
is interested in computing the result of a given func-
tion (e.g. the majority function) when applied to the
agents’ private information (e.g. bit values represent-
ing the alternatives they support). A most general
variant of this problem is the multi-party computa-
tion problem. In that setting the agents themselves
are also interested in learning the value of the given
function, when applied to the agents’ private infor-
mation (sometime referred to as the agents’ secrets).
This general setting is central to computer science and
reasoning about uncertainty. For example, it captures
basic problems in computation based on a distributed
data base, in computing a population statistic such
as an order statistic, in computing a clearing price in
(say) a two-sided auction, and in voting. We address
information elicitation in this setting from a game the-
oretic perspective and introduce a ‘multi party com-
putation game’. We assume that the agents are selfish
and are driven by utility maximization considerations.
On the one hand, they would like to receive the value
of the multi party computation, but on the other hand
they may not want to contribute to this computation,
but rather free-ride on other agents’ efforts.
The particular (although very general) setting we
study is the following.1 Each agent has a secret, which
is accessible only to him. However, access to that se-
cret is costly and agents may choose to access it, or
not.2 Thus, accessing one’s own private information
becomes a strategic question. This approach generates
a natural tension between the socially (and even pri-
vately) optimal action, which is to compute the joint
1The study presented in this paper shares its motiva-
tion, and some of the presentation with a complementary
line of research presented in another paper we submitted to
a game-theory forum (Smorodinsky & Tennenholtz 2003).
The current paper however concentrates, in difference to
that other work, on the major problem of finding crite-
ria for the existence of appropriate information elicitation
mechanisms, as well as on the computational complexity
of verifying the existence of such mechanisms.
2One can think of computational cost, cost of accessing
a data base, or even a learning cost.
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function correctly, and agents’ incentive to free-ride.
In order to overcome this tension (and enable the elic-
itation of the desired information) one may need to de-
sign an elicitation mechanism to prevent (some or all)
agents from free-riding, elicit agents’ secrets and exe-
cute the desired computation. To better understand
the basic tension in the multi-party computation game
consider the following:
Example 1 Assume there are 11 agents, each having
a private value which equals either 0 or 1 with equal
probabilities and which are independent. The agents
would like to compute the simple majority function.
Consider a situation where each agent must pay 0.4
for accessing his secret, but values the correct result
of the computation at 1. A simple elicitation mecha-
nism asks the agents, in some arbitrary order, for their
secrets. The mechanism will halt when the value of
the majority is already determined. The strategy tuple
where all agents choose to access their secrets, if/when
approached, and report them truthfully is not an equi-
librium. To see this consider the perspective of agent 1,
the first agent to be approached. Assuming all agents
will reply (truthfully, or not) if/when approached, then
agent 1 can alter the outcome of the majority function
only if the other 10 replies split evenly between 0 and 1,
which has a probability of 10!5!5!0.5
10 ≈ 14 . Therefore, by
accessing his own secret an agent gains, at most (as-
suming all others access their secrets), 1 − 0.4 = 0.6.
However, by guessing, and assuming all other agents
compute, he will gain 0.25 × 0.5 + 0.75 × 1 = 0.875
(where 0.25 is the probability of being pivotal as com-
puted above, and 0.5 is the probability of guessing the
”right” value in this case). So agent 1 has no incentive
to compute.
What the above example demonstrates is that a naive
way of approaching agents might not work. Indeed, if
all agents are approached simultaneously then we will
face a similar problem. This motivates the careful dis-
cussion of sequential elicitation mechanisms, i.e. the
construction of mechanisms that approach agents in a
well designed sequence.
The design of mechanisms that deal with agent incen-
tives is the subject of study of the theory of mecha-
nism design in game theory. Most models discussed
in that theory look at mechanisms that actually com-
municate with all agents simultaneously. Sequential
mechanisms discussed in that literature are typically
multi-stage games where the designer/center does not
access agents sequentially, but the agents themselves
may choose actions sequentially. In this paper we con-
sider mechanisms that approach one agent after the
other (we refer to these as sequential mechanisms).
The intuition behind the adoption of sequential mech-
anisms is as follows. Assume there are agents with low
(access / computation / learning) costs. These agents
can be approached first. It is possible that based on
their replies the desired multi party computation can
be carried out. However, if this is not the case then,
intuitively, the impact of the other agents on the re-
sult of the computation (their pivotalness) increases,
and so the incentive to incur the cost and compute
increases. We demonstrate this argument in the fol-
lowing example:
Example 2 Consider 4 agents, each having a secret
of either 0 or 1, drawn independently with equal prob-
abilities. The agents would like to know whether they
have a consensus or not. Assume three of them have
very low computation costs (say, zero) and the fourth
has a cost of 0.4. A mechanism that approaches the
forth agent first (or all agents simultaneously) may fail
to compute correctly as the fourth agent will choose
to ‘guess’ his secret (by guessing his payoff is 0.875,
whereas by accessing the secret the payoff is 0.6). How-
ever, if the mechanism approaches the first three before
it approaches the 4th agent, then we either may learn
the true value (which is the case if there is lack of con-
sensus already among these three) or may update the
fourth agent about the previous replies. In this case the
fourth agent’s ‘pivotalness’ increases and so by guess-
ing he expects a payoff of 0.5, compared to 0.6, when
not guessing. Consequently, the fourth agent will ac-
cess his secret and the mechanism will surely compute
correctly.
The class of multi party computations we study is that
of anonymous functions. An anonymous function is
one where the function’s value does not depend on
the identity of the agents but on the secrets only. In
other words, a permutation of agents’ secrets will not
change the value of the function. This class of func-
tions is quite elementary and often used in models.
Among the anonymous functions are majority, con-
sensus, unanimity, average, variance, order statistic,
percentile and more.
The basic new terminology we introduce for sequential
mechanisms is that of an ‘appropriate mechanism’. A
mechanism is deemed appropriate if for all realizations
of secrets the function will be computed correctly, in
an equilibrium (additionally, there may be equilibria
of appropriate mechanism where this is not the case).
In the paper we concentrate on mechanisms that are
to act in fully revealing (e.g. broadcast) environment.
In such setting the agent to be approached, and its
response, is observed by all agents. We believe that
this is a most appropriate setting for a basic model
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of information elicitation in multi-agent systems. We
later discuss the effects that may be suggested by con-
sidering other models and extensions.
Informally, the main contributions we report on are as
follows:
• We introduce a general setting for information
elicitation in multi-agent settings, captured by the
”multi-party computation game”.
• We provide an efficient algorithm for constructing
an appropriate mechanism, if such mechanism ex-
ists.
• We provide a characterization for the existence of
appropriate mechanisms.
• We provide an efficient verification algorithm for
the existence of an appropriate mechanism.
• We show that by allowing private communication,
as well as by allowing probabilistic mechanisms,
we can sometime improve the prospect of finding
appropriate mechanisms.
2 Model
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents. Each
agent j has a unique secret, sj ∈ {0, 1}, that he may
compute. Let 0.5 ≤ q < 1 be the prior probability
of sj = 1 and assume these events are independent.
3
Agents may compute their own secrets, however, com-
putation is costly and agent j pays cj ≥ 0 for com-
puting sj . Without loss of generality we shall assume
c1 ≤ c2 ≤ . . . ≤ cn (in words, agents are ordered by
their costs).
Agents are interested in computing some joint binary
parameter (e.g., the majority vote or whether they
have a consensus) that depends on the vector of pri-
vate inputs. Let G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} denote the
desired computation. Each agent j has a utility of vj
from learning the real value of G. We will assume that
vj > cj , otherwise the agent faces no dilemma (we
assume no side payments).
In the exposition we will use the convention that vj =
1. This is done without loss of generality, as the more
general case where vj > cj > 0, is equivalent to the
case where the value of agent j is 1 but the cost is
cj
vj
.
A central designer elicits the agents’ secrets, computes
G and reports the computed value of G back to each
3The results apply for all 0 < q < 1, however we assume
w.l.o.g. that the probability of the event {sj = 1} is greater
than or equal to that of {sj = 0}.
agent. In this setup each agent faces a dilemma of
whether to compute his private secret sj , at a cost of
cj , or perhaps to submit a guess to the central designer.
The desired property of a mechanism is the correct
computation of G, which is done through the elici-
tation of secrets from sufficiently many agents. One
should note that as the cost of each agent’s computa-
tion, cj , is lower than the gain from computing G, the
socially optimal outcome is to compute. However, free
riding of agents may undermine the ability to reach
the social optimum.
In the introduction we considered an example where
computation and truth revealing is not in equilibrium.
The following example illustrates another situation.
Example 3 - Let G be the parity function, q = 0.5,
and cj = 0.4 for all j = 1, . . . , 11. Once again, con-
sider a simple mechanism that asks the agents in ar-
bitrary order for their secret and computes G. In this
example each agent, when approached, is pivotal and
therefore all agents computing is an equilibrium, and
so G will be computed correctly.
2.1 Sequential Mechanisms
It is interesting to note that there may be a strict
advantage in approaching agents sequentially. The in-
tuition is that agents with a high computational cost
may not be willing to compute, unless convinced they
are pivotal. However, if some agents with low com-
putation cost have already provided their secret the
other agents may face one of two situations. Either G
can be computed from previous replies or it cannot.
In the latter case the remaining agents may be more
pivotal, perhaps sufficiently pivotal to justify a costly
computation.
We now model mechanisms that approach agents se-
quentially. We will assume that the communication
between the center and the agents is fully revealed by
all agents. This can be associated with having broad-
cast communication. Moreover, we find this as an
excellent model for introducing the idea of informa-
tion elicitation in multi-agent systems, since it allows
a simple setting where basic fundamental results can
be obtained. Nevertheless, in Section 5 we discuss the
possible advantages of having private channels.
A sequential mechanism (or mechanism) is an ordering
of the set of agents, where the kth agent in the order
is defined according to the reply of its predecessors.
Furthermore the kth agent is provided with the replies
of its predecessors.
Formally, let Hi = {0, 1}
i be the set of histories of
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length i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and H0 = Λ where Λ is the
empty (null) history. Let H = ∪ni=0Hi. A sequen-
tial mechanism is a pair (g, f) where g : H → N de-
termines the agent to be approached, and f : H →
{0, 1, ∗} is a function that expresses a decision about
whether to halt and output either 0 or 1, or continue
the elicitation process (denoted by ∗). We will assume
that if g(h) = j then g(h′) = j for every h′ where h
is a prefix of h′, i.e. an agent is approached at most
once.
The action space of each agent, j, is the set {compute,
don’t compute} × {0, 1}. The first coordinate refers
to whether the agent chooses to go through the costly
computation and the second coordinate is what the
agent chooses to inform the central mechanism.
Note that this implies that each agent has 6 (and not
4) actions: Don’t compute and report 0, Don’t com-
pute and report 1, Compute and report 0, Compute
and report 1, Compute and report the true computed
value, and Compute and report a false value. Let us
denote by Γ the set of actions.
A pure strategy for agent j, xj : 2
H → Γ, assigns
an action to each possible subset of histories, and a
(mixed) strategy, Xj : 2
H → ∆(Γ), assigns a proba-
bility distribution over Γ. The parameter q, alongside
the tuple of (mixed) strategies, {Xj}
n
j=1, determines
the probability that G will be computed.
An equilibrium for the mechanism A = (f, g), is a
vector of n strategies, one for each agent, such that
each agent’s strategy is the best response against the
other agents’ strategies.
We seek mechanisms which can compute the true value
of G in equilibrium. In fact, it is required that the
mechanism computes G with certainty. Therefore we
seek mechanisms that induce sufficiently many agents
to compute their true secret, in order for G to be com-
puted. Note that in many cases G may be computed
with partial information. For example, in the case of a
consensus function it is sufficient to elicit information
sequentially until we get 2 different replies, which are
truthful.
Definition 1 A mechanism A is appropriate for G
at 0.5 ≤ q < 1 if there exists an equilibrium where G
can surely be computed for all vector of agents’ secrets.
Such an equilibrium is referred to as a computing equi-
librium, and A is called q-appropriate.
3 Constructing appropriate
mechanisms
Having introduced the general setting, our aim is now
to deal with the actual construction of appropriate
mechanisms. We face two major challenges:
1. We wish to have an effective procedure for char-
acterizing the behavior of an appropriate mecha-
nism, if exists. In particular, we should come up
with a technique for deciding on the ”next agent
to be approached” as a function of the history.
2. We wish to have an efficient procedure for check-
ing the existence of an appropriate mechanism.
In this section we deal with the first issue, while the
other one will be discussed in the next session. We now
introduce the HCF (High Cost First) algorithm for
(dynamically) ordering the agents. We omit some of
the secondary details to be discussed in the full paper.
• Step One - For each possible prefix, i.e. string of
0 and 1’s, of length in between 0 and n− 1, com-
pute the probability of being pivotal, conditional
on agents being truthful. By knowing this proba-
bility we will have an upper bound on the cost of
an agent that is expected to compute in equilib-
rium. Note that if G is anonymous then checking
this is polynomial, given a particular prefix.
• Step Two - Let us denote by Zj the event that
j is pivotal, and consider the following recursive
structure. For any given set of agents and costs
choose the agent to move first as follows - Con-
sider all agents with a cost low enough to jus-
tify computing (namely all j such that 1 − cj ≥
Prob(Zj) · q + P (Z
c
j ) · 1) and approach the agent
with the highest cost among these. Notice that
this computation for an anonymous function is
polynomial.
• Use this procedure to allocate the first agent (σ1).
Depending on the reply of σ1 you end up with
one of two trees. Apply the same procedure again
to each tree, where at each time you are not al-
lowed to allocate agents that have been already
allocated, and so on and so forth.
Using HCF we can show:
Theorem 1 Let G be an anonymous function. As-
sume it is common knowledge that there exists an ap-
propriate mechanism for G, then the mechanism in-
duced by the HCF algorithm has a computing equilib-
rium.
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Proof (sktech): We use an inductive argument, on
the total number of agents. For n = 1 this is straight-
forward. Assume the statement of the theorem holds
for all problems with n = N agents and consider a
problem with n = N + 1 agents.
It is common knowledge that the original problem has
an appropriate mechanism. Assume agent k is the
first agent in that appropriate mechanism. We now
know two things. First, that 1 − ck ≥ Prob(Zk) ·
q + P (Zck) · 1, and second, that in the two problems
induced, following k’s reply, there are n = N agents
(all N + 1 agents, but k) and it is common knowledge
that an appropriate mechanism exists.
Consider agent σ1 that was chosen by our algorithm.
By definition cσ1 ≥ ck (note that due to anonymity
Prob(Zσ1) · q+Prob(Z
c
σ1
) · 1 =Prob(Zk) · q+Prob(Zck) ·
1). Hence, if agent σ1 moves first the existence of an
appropriate mechanism for the two problems it induces
is common knowledge. Notice that using cσ1 instead of
ck can be only helpful, and each sub-case will remain
appropriate.
Now, by our induction hypothesis, the algorithm in-
duces an appropriate mechanism for each of the two
games induced by σ1’s reply, and so a computing equi-
librium exists. It is therefore a best reply for agent σ1
to compute as well. QED
Note that the algorithm suggested can be implemented
on-line. In other words, computation may take place
only along the realized path. This is particularly inter-
esting from a complexity point of view, as the number
of histories along a particular path is n, whereas the
total number of histories in H is of the order of mag-
nitude of 2n (and a naive off-line algorithm will have
to refer to each of them).
The above result hinges on the existence of an appro-
priate mechanism. However, verifying whether such
a mechanism exists may be a non trivial task. One
intuitive way to proceed with such a verification pro-
cess is to apply the algorithm suggested in the proof of
Theorem 1 and eventually check whether the resulting
mechanism is appropriate. However, this naive ap-
proach turns out to be exponentially complex, as each
play path along the tree will have to be checked. The
next section discusses the complexity of algorithms for
verifying the existence of appropriate mechanisms.
4 The existence of appropriate
mechanisms
In this section we discuss what we believe to be a
central technical problem in information elicitation in
multi-agent systems. We wish to characterize condi-
tions for the existence of computing equilibrium, i.e.
find necessary and sufficient conditions for the exis-
tence of an appropriate mechanism. Moreover, we are
interested in making an algorithmic use of this char-
acterization. Indeed, we will show such characteriza-
tion that leads to a polynomial algorithm for checking
whether an appropriate mechanism exists.
We are interested in an efficient algorithm that, given
the values c1, . . . , cn, q, and a succinct representation
of an anonymous function (namely the number of 1’s
in the input needed for having the value 1. Note that
this is a list of up to n + 1 numbers), decides whether
there exists an appropriate mechanism or not. The
algorithm we propose is composed of a ”verification
criterion” and a low complexity algorithm verifying
whether this criterion is satisfied. We begin by treat-
ing the criterion issue, which is based on the appro-
priateness of the HCF algorithm. Later we turn to
translate this into an efficient verification algorithm.
Let G be an arbitrary anonymous function. Consider
a directed graph G′ = (V,E) where the set of nodes is
V = {(i, k) : i, k ∈ Z+, 0 ≤ k ≤ i ≤ n}, and the set of
edges is E = {((i, k), (i + 1, k)) : 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, k ≤
i} ∪ {((i, k), (i + 1, k + 1)) : 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, k ≤ i}.
Intuitively, this graph describes the possible states of
information, when approaching agents while comput-
ing the value of an anonymous function, and the possi-
ble state transitions. Every state describes how many
agents have been approached and how many 1’s have
been heard so far. In particular, the node v = (j, l)
in G′ is interpreted as the event that j agents have
been approached and l 1’s (and j − l 0’s) have been
reported.
For each such node we may ask whether the value of
G can be computed, or not. Let G¯ = (V¯ , E¯) be the
graph induced by reducing G′ to include only nodes
where the value of the function G is still unknown.
Notice that G¯ is a DAG.
For every node in G¯, v, let c(v) be the largest i, for
which 1 − ci ≥ Prob(Zi|v) · q + P (Z
c
i |v), where Zi is
the event that agent i is pivotal for the function G.
Namely, if c(v) = i then every agent j ≤ i will sat-
isfy the above inequality (i.e., will have incentive to
check its secret, assuming the rest of the agents check
their secrets, when approached), and every agent j > i
will not satisfy the above inequality (i.e. will not have
incentive to check its secret, assuming the rest of the
agents check their secrets). Assume that for some node
v in G¯, c(v) is undefined, then this implies that no
agent will have incentive to check and so an appro-
priate mechanism will not exist. Therefore, we will
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consider below only cases where c(v) can be defined
for every node v.
Our algorithm is based on the following criterion:
Theorem 2 Let G¯ = (V¯ , E¯) be the directed graph as-
sociated with an anonymous function G, 0.5 ≤ q < 1,
and let c(v), for any v ∈ V¯ , be defined as above. Then,
there exists a q-appropriate mechanism iff there does
not exist a path in G¯ originating from (0, 0) and lead-
ing to some end-node v, (v1 = (0, 0), v2, . . . , vl = v),
for which there exists some 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that
|{vj : c(vj) ≤ i}| > i.
Proof (sketch):
Proof of the first direction - Assume there exists a
path in G¯ originating in node (0, 0), and leading to
some end node v, (v1 = (0, 0), . . . , vl = v), and some i
such that |{vj : c(vj) ≤ i}| > i then since v is a reach-
able state (if v = (k, l) then we will reach v whenever
after approaching k agents we have been reported on
l 1’s and k − l 0’s) the above condition immediately
implies that there will be an agent who will not check
its secret while this agent is pivotal (since the graph
consists only of nodes where the value of G is still unde-
termined). This means that in this case no sequential
mechanism is appropriate.
Proof of the second direction - Assume an appropriate
mechanism does not exist. Then, the HCF mechanism
will not be appropriate. Let v be a node where the
HCF mechanism halts and let (v1 = (0, 0), . . . , vl = v)
be the specific path leading to v. As HCF halts we con-
clude that it has already placed all agents 1, 2, . . . , c(v)
along the path (v1 = (0, 0), . . . , vl = v). Denote by
i the maximal number for which all agents 1, 2, . . . , i
have been placed by the HCF. In particular this means
that i+1 was not placed. Obviously i ≥ c(v). For any
j ≤ i let vj be the node at which j was placed.
We claim that c(vj) ≤ i. Assume this is incorrect and
c(vj) > i. In this case HCF would have chosen i + 1,
which is available at this node, or a higher cost agent,
and not agent j (recall j ≤ i). Therefore along the
path (v1 = (0, 0), . . . , vl = v), |{vj : c(vj) ≤ i}| >
i, and so any path from the origin to an end node
which prefix is (v1 = (0, 0), . . . , vl = v) satisfies the
property that there exists some 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that
|{vj : c(vj) ≤ i}| > i. QED
We use the appropriateness criterion of Theorem 2 to
present an efficient algorithm for verifying appropri-
ateness:
Theorem 3 Let G be an anonymous function, and
consider a set of n agents, with costs c1, . . . , cn, and
a parameter 0 < q < 1, then there exists a polynomial
algorithm for checking the existence of an appropriate
mechanism
Proof (sktech):
1. We construct the graph G¯ and compute the c(v)’s.
Notice that since the function is anonymous, these
computations are polynomial. If c(v) can not be
determined for some node then there is no appro-
priate mechanism.
2. For any end-node v = (k, l) ∈ V¯ we check whether
there is a path of length j+1 annotated by c(v)’s
of value j or lower connecting (0, 0) to that node
(for any j between 1 and n)
• Construct a graph where every node v′ which
is associated with c(v′) ≤ j gets the weight
1, and each other node gets the weight 0.
• Look for the maximal weighted path (i.e. a
path where the sum of weights is maximized)
between (0, 0) and v and check if it is of value
j+1 or more. Notice that this is polynomial.
3. If no such path is found (for any node v) then
there exists an appropriate mechanism, and oth-
erwise there is no appropriate mechanism.
The proof follows from Theorem 2, the feasibility of
generating the graph G¯ and the efficiency of standard
path finding algorithm. Details omitted. QED
Notice that theorems 2 and 3 introduce an interest-
ing complexity-theoretic lesson. These theorems do
not tell us that there exists an efficient procedure that
outputs an appropriate mechanism. Indeed, the size
of the description of such a mechanism may be expo-
nentially large. However, these theorems give us an
efficient procedure for studying the existence of such
a mechanism, although the mechanism, if exists, may
not be off-line (efficiently) constructed. In addition,
given the results of section 3, if our (efficient) pro-
cedure verifies that an appropriate mechanism exists,
then it can be (efficiently) constructed on-line (in a
step by step fashion). We believe that this situation,
where the decision problem and the search problem
have such inter-play, sheds an interesting light on the
study of the complexity of mechanisms for information
elicitation.
5 Extensions: Privacy and
Randomness
Our model introduces information elicitation in the
framework of a basic setting, where each agent is pro-
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vided with full information about the history until
it has been approached. While this is a natural ba-
sic model, one may consider extended models, where
agents may be provided only with partial information.
We now briefly discuss this extension.
5.1 Privacy: Providing Partial Information
Partial information is modelled by having mechanisms
where the information provided is also a function of
the history. Formally, this can me modelled by adding
to the definition of the mechanism another function:
h : H → 2H where this function states which infor-
mation will be provided as a function of the history so
far. Notice that in general the mechanism may “cheat”
about the history observed so far; an agent’s state of
information will be determined by his knowledge of
the mechanism and the information provided to him
by the mechanism (the formal definition is therefore
as in the theory of knowledge, as used in AI and dis-
tributed computing (Fagin et al. 1995)). Notice that
this general definition enables to express the simulta-
neous mechanism (by always providing all agents with
the information 2H). Moreover, it allows to approach
agent i after two different histories (k, l) and (k′, l′)
without the agent knowing which history is the actual
one (as long as one of these histories is not a prefix of
the other). We can then define computing equilibrium
and appropriate mechanisms as before. We can show:
Proposition 1 There exist anonymous functions,
ci’s and q, for which there does not exist an appro-
priate mechanism in the full information setting, but
there exists an appropriate mechanism in the partial
information setting.
5.2 Probabilistic Mechanisms
Another question of interest relates to a ran-
dom/probabilistic behavior of the information elici-
tation mechanism. In particular, we ask whether
probabilistic mechanisms may be helpful in leading
to computing equilibrium. This topic is not an is-
sue when considering our basic (“broadcast”) setting;
in this case it is easy to see that since the center and
the agents have the same information about the his-
tory, probabilistic decisions (about the agent to be
approached) are not helpful. However, probabilistic
mechanisms may be helpful when considering the par-
tial information setting. We can show:
Proposition 2 There exists an anonymous function,
ci’s and q, for which there does not exist an appropri-
ate deterministic mechanism in the partial informa-
tion setting, but there exists an appropriate probabilis-
tic mechanism. The result remains valid also when we
require all ci’s to be identical.
Notice that this result shows the power of sequential
mechanisms also for the case where all agents have
identical costs. Indeed, it can be shown that when
all costs are equal then any deterministic sequential
mechanism can not do better than the simultaneous
simple mechanism. However, Proposition 2 shows that
in the case of equal costs a probabilistic sequential
mechanism can be more effective than such determin-
istic mechanisms. This serves as further evidence to
the power of information elicitation using sequential
mechanisms.
6 Discussion
This paper introduced sequential information elici-
tation in multi-agent systems, using the multi-party
computation game. The novelty of our approach stems
from treating multi-party computation as a public
good setting, where costly computation of private in-
puts leads to free-riding problem, and from the intro-
duction and study of mechanisms (and in particular
sequential mechanisms) for overcoming this problem.
Our paper emphasizes the existence of appropriate
mechanisms. In particular we show an algorithm for
verifying the existence of an appropriate mechanism,
as well as provide a criterion for existence. Most of this
is carried out for the case of broadcast communication
channels. The issue of private channels, which is dis-
cussed only briefly, is a subject of a complementary
study (Smorodinsky & Tennenholtz 2003). Although
the discussion of private channels can be viewed as an
extension of the work on broadcast communication,
the previously mentioned work does not deal with the
problem of existence. While for the question of exis-
tence we provide in this paper a general (and positive,
from the computational perspective) answer, the study
of random mechanisms and their power, introduced in
the previous section, is a subject that deserves much
further attention.
Multi-party computation is a central topic in computer
science. The main objective discussed in the litera-
ture on multi-party computation is to devise protocols
for collective computation of a function’s value with-
out having any information revealed to the parties,
beyond the function’s value (see Goldreich (Goldreich
1998) for a recent general overview, and Linial (Linial
1994) for a discussion of a game-theoretic perspective
on that issue). Although game-theoretic in nature,
multi-party computation does not include standard
game-theoretic analysis. A complementary perspec-
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tive, which does adopt a game-theoretic approach to
multi-party computation, has been recently introduced
by Shoham and Tennenholtz (Shoham & Tennenholtz
2002). In their setting, titled non-cooperative com-
puting, an agent’s utility is effected by two factors:
a primary objective of computing the function, and
a secondary objective of preventing others from com-
puting it. They provide full characterization of the
boolean functions that can be non-cooperatively com-
puted under various assumptions on the economic set-
ting (e.g. private values vs. correlated values) and
the algorithmic setting (e.g. deterministic vs. prob-
abilistic algorithms). Most recently, work that at-
tempts to combine secure multi-party computation
and non-cooperative computing has been introduced
by McGrew, Porter and Shoham (McGrew, Porter,
& Shoham 2003), and work that deals with non-
cooperative computing where there is no center has
been introduced by Halpern and Teague (Halpern &
Teague 2004). This work can be viewed as dealing with
externalities in multi-party computation, and does not
deal with the free-riding problem and the role of se-
quential information elicitation.
Recent work in AI has been concerned with algorithms
for preference elicitation (see e.g. (Conen & Sandholm
2001; Boutilier et al. 2003)). Our work contributes
also to the literature on techniques for preference and
information elicitation. However, although some of
that work adopts a game-theoretic perspective (see e.g.
(Shoham & Tennenholtz 2001)), it does not deal with
the fact private information might be costly to acquire,
and with the fundamental free riding problem this is-
sue introduces in a strategic multi-agent setting.
The study of free riding has a long tradition in Eco-
nomics and Game Theory, in particular in the context
of the Public Good problem (e.g., chapter 13 in Mas-
Colell, Whinston and Green (Mas-Colell, Whinston, &
Green 1995)). In many models it is shown that free
riding is sufficiently destructive to prevent socially op-
timal outcome (e.g., Rob (Rob 1989) and Mailath and
Postlewaite (Mailath & A. 2000)). In this paper, we
take a more constructive approach and seek mecha-
nisms that overcome the free riding problem and result
in the efficient outcome, which is the correct execution
of the multi-party computation.
In future work we plan to make the setting more tightly
related to preference elicitation. One way to obtain
this is by considering situations where the agent’s pri-
vate information captures also its preference on the
function’s outcome. It may be also interesting to con-
sider minimizing the cost of elicitation. Other cases
of interest include handling less symmetric cases, e.g.
when agents may have different probability distribu-
tions on possible secrets.
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